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STA TON V. BOEING:' AN EXERCISE IN THE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION STANDARD OF
REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent decision of Staton v. Boeing Co., 2 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit effectively opened the
appellate court as an alternative forum for de novo review of factual
questions. The Ninth Circuit was charged with reviewing a district
court's 3 decision to certify a class and approve a proposed consent
decree. The class consisted of approximately 15,000 African-
American employees of Boeing who alleged systematic, company-
wide race discrimination.4 After two fairness hearings,5 the district
court approved a consent decree outlining $7.3 million in monetary
relief as well as injunctive relief valued at approximately $3.65
million.6 The decree also awarded class counsel approximately $4
million in fees and costs.
7
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's decision to certify
the class, but reversed and remanded the approval of the consent
decree because of concerns related to the attorneys' fee award and
the structure of the monetary payments to class members. 8 The
dissent argued that the settlement agreement should have been
upheld, and that the Ninth Circuit failed to apply the abuse of
1. 327 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2003).
2. Id.
3. The case was heard before the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington.
4. Staton, 327 F.3d at 944, 946.
5. Id. at 945, 951-52.
6. Id. at 944, 948-49.
7. Id. at 944-45.
8. Id. at 945.
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discretion standard of review,9 despite its claims that it did apply
such a standard.' 0
This Comment reviews the analysis of both the district court and
the Ninth Circuit court, and it argues that the district court acted
within its discretion in deciding that the class was appropriate and
that the award distribution to class members was fair, adequate, and
reasonable." This Comment further argues that the Ninth Circuit
erred by applying a "quasi de novo" standard of review 12 to
questions of class award distribution, and thus erred in reversing on
this ground.
13
Part II reviews the facts of Staton. Part III focuses on the abuse
of discretion standard and what the standard really means. Part IV
tackles the analysis of Staton with regard to fund distribution.
Finally, Part V concludes that appellate courts should exercise care
when reviewing decisions to avoid creating a quasi de novo system
of review for questions of fact before the appellate court.
9. See infra Part III for a discussion of the abuse of discretion standard of
review.
10. Staton, 327 F.3d at 986 (Trott, J., dissenting).
11. These three requirements are discussed in Part IV.B. 1.
12. The author has chosen to use the term quasi de novo to express how the
Ninth Circuit reviewed this decision. By stating that it was applying an abuse
of discretion standard, yet, as discussed below, delving too deeply into the
facts, the Ninth Circuit in effect used a 'middle ground' standard of review.
As a result, the opinion looks more like it used de novo review, despite the
court's claim to have used abuse of discretion.
13. This Comment does not address the Ninth Circuit's ground of reversal
based on the line item attorneys' fee award. While there are arguments for and
against that portion of the decision (for a brief discussion see supra note 56),
the question of whether the Ninth Circuit properly reviewed the district court's
decision as to the distribution of funds is a separate question that deserves
discussion in and of itself. Nor does this Comment argue that the case should
not have been remanded since the problem of attorneys' fees cannot be
separated from the remainder of the consent decree. However, by reversing on
the ground that the distribution was unfair, the Ninth Circuit erroneously
provided an additional ground for its decision.
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II. FACTS OF STATON
A. The Proposed Class
Staton's proposed class consisted of approximately 15,000
African-American employees of Boeing Company, 14 some of whom
had initiated individual suits against Boeing. 15  The class
representatives, who alleged company-wide racial discrimination,
16
were supervisors as well as rank-and-file workers. 17 Class members
included union and non-union members, salaried and hourly
employees, and employees from numerous Boeing facilities.' 8
B. The Consent Decree
Settlement discussions began in November 1998, and by
January 1999 class counsel and Boeing had reached an agreement.
1 9
The consent decree submitted to the district court outlined $7.3
million in monetary damages, various forms of injunctive relief, and
approximately $4 million in attorneys' fees and costs.20 The decree
allowed class members to opt out of monetary relief, but not
14. Staton, 327 F.3d at 944.
15. Id. at 946. In March 1998 forty-three employees filed individual suits
in Seattle alleging individual claims of race discrimination. Id. Twelve of
these plaintiffs joined four others to file the class action that triggered the
consent decree in question. Id. Plaintiffs from a second class action initiated
in Philadelphia consolidated their case with the Seattle class action in October
1998. Id. In an amended complaint dated November 4, 1998, thirty-two
named plaintiffs sought to represent all African-American Boeing employees.
Id. These named plaintiffs, as well as over two hundred others, signed retainer
agreements with class counsel. Id.
16. Id. at 954.
17. Id. at 958.
18. Id. at 954.
19. Id. at 946-47.
20. Id. at 944-45. The $4 million figure is divided as follows: Boeing
agreed to pay $3 million in attorneys' fees and costs incurred to date, as well as
up to $100,000 to explain the consent decree to class members, $200,000 to
objectors' counsel, and $750,000 for monitoring, administering, implementing,
and defending the decree. Id. at 948-49.
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equitable relief.21 Class members who did not opt out agreed to a
broad release provision.
22
The monetary award was allocated such that $3.77 million was
divided among 264 specific individuals-the named plaintiffs and
those who actively participated in the litigation.23 Most of these
individuals were also identified by plaintiffs' counsel as those with
the strongest claims or those that were willing to take the risk of
coming forward and pursuing the case. 24  The remaining $3.53
million were available for all other class members to submit claims.
25
The injunctive relief covered many grounds. The primary
provisions included: a statement similar to the statutory prohibition
on discrimination; a requirement that Boeing meet with an advisory
committee of class members to discuss concerns; Boeing's hiring a
consultant to assist in meeting the objectives of injunctive relief;
implementation of systems to inform employees of promotion
procedures, opportunities and recipients; and implementation of
programs to provide feedback and training to applicants who do not
receive promotions.26 There was some dispute as to whether the
injunctive relief required Boeing to provide outside counsel to
African-American employees to assist them in promotions and to
mitigate potential disputes.
27
21. Id. at 947-48. This is consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b).
22. Staton, 327 F.3d at 947. The consent decree released Boeing from all
liability to African-American employees for race discrimination, as well as
from any liability for "'negligent misrepresentation, fraud, detrimental
reliance, promissory estoppel, or breach of contract."' Id. (quoting the consent
decree).
23. Id at 948.
24. Id. at 975-76.
25. Id. at 948.
26. Id. at 949-51.
27. The injunctive provisions required that class counsel monitor Boeing's
feedback and training systems for unsuccessful promotion candidates, and that
Boeing meet and confer with class counsel regarding company policies about
internal complaints as well as their informal systems for notifying candidates
about promotional opportunities. Id. at 950. However, these provisions do not
require Boeing to take the suggestions of class counsel. Id. Although the
experts the district court relied upon submitted their statements based on the
belief that counsel would provide free legal assistance in the above situations
for three years, Boeing and the Ninth Circuit indicated a belief that free
individualized legal assistance was not actually required of class counsel. Id.
at 961-62. The Ninth Circuit further expressed skepticism that the $750,000
STA TON V. BOEING
III. THE ABUSE OF DISCRETION STANDARD
The majority and dissenting opinions in Staton agreed that the
appropriate standard of review for both class certification and the
settlement agreement was the abuse of discretion standard.28 The
Ninth Circuit has previously held that "[t]he district court's 'decision
to approve or reject a settlement is committed to the sound discretion
of the trial judge because he is exposed to the litigants, and their
strategies, positions, and proof.' ' 29 The problem addressed by this
Comment is how the Ninth Circuit applied this standard in reviewing
the district court's decision to approve the Boeing settlement
agreement.
What does it mean for an appellate court to review for abuse of
discretion? It is not enough for a court to merely say it has applied
this standard. Rather, the court must determine what level of
discretion is acceptable, and what constitutes an abuse. Various
courts will define abuse in different ways-such is the nature of
something so abstract as a "standard of review." However, the Ninth
Circuit has held that it "will affirm if the district court judge applies
the proper legal standard and his findings of fact are not clearly
erroneous."
30
Thus, an appellate court should focus on whether the district
court applied the correct law, as well as the procedural mechanisms
used by a district court to review and analyze the facts, rather than
focusing on the facts alone. It is a district court's duty to discover
and interpret the facts, to decide which facts are credible, and to
determine if the facts fulfill the requirements of the law. It is an
appellate court's duty to review the district court's findings, to
determine if the facts could mean what the district court says they
provided to class counsel in the consent decree would cover both the costs of
implementing the consent decree and providing any legal services that were
actually required. Id. at 962.
28. Id. at 953; id. at 986 (Trott, J., dissenting).
29. In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 458 (9th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998)).
30. Id. Other circuits ask similar questions. For example, the Tenth Circuit
states there must be "a distinct showing it was based on a clearly erroneous
finding of fact or an erroneous conclusion of law or manifests a clear error of
judgment." Rutter & Wilbanks Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 314 F.3d 1180, 1187
(10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Cartier v. Jackson, 59 F.3d 1046, 1048 (10th Cir.
1995)).
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mean, and, if so, to decide if the facts as laid out by the district court
could support the district court's decision.
In an appellate court's analysis, the substance of the case is an
indicator of abuse of discretion, and it is necessary to understand the
facts to properly understand a district court's decision. However, an
appellate court should not give new meaning to the facts in making
an ultimate decision regarding abuse of discretion because the
entirety of the evidence is not before the appellate court.3 ' Instead,
the facts as established by the trial court should guide an appellate
court in its review.32 In sum, an appellate court is charged with
determining whether the district court's interpretation was clearly
erroneous or unsupported.
For example, in Mego the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision to uphold a $1.725 million settlement in a securities
class action.33 The Mego court laid out the appellant's arguments,34
discussed the appropriate legal standard for each discrete issue,
3 5
evaluated the district court's review and application of the facts to
the standard,36 and determined that the district court could reasonably
have concluded as it did and thus did not abuse its discretion. 37 In
Mego the court did not substantively review the facts to make its own
conclusion; instead it procedurally reviewed the district court's.
analysis and interpretation of the facts.
31. See, e.g., Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026 ("the decision to approve or reject a
settlement is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge because he is
'exposed to the litigants, and their strategies, positions and proof."') (quoting
Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of San Francisco, 688 F.2d 615,
626 (9th Cir. 1982); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact... shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.").
32. Of course the appellate court must determine if the trial court was
clearly erroneous in establishing the facts, and thus must independently review
the facts to some extent. However, this factual review is limited to a
determination of whether or not the trial court was clearly erroneous in its
interpretation of the evidence before it. To this end, it is useful for a district
court to set forth a clear record of the evidence reviewed and the conclusions
drawn from the evidence.
33. In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d at 456.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 458, 460, 462.
36. Id. at 458-63.
37. Id. at 463.
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Based on the above concepts, this Comment sets forth the
following analysis. When reviewing any district court decision, the
Ninth Circuit should ask: (1) based on the general facts, what issues
are before the court; (2) what is the proper legal standard to apply to
those issues; (3) did the district court apply this legal standard; (4)
did the district court fully analyze the facts, without leaving out key
details, and with respect to the proper legal standard; 38 and (5) could
the district court have concluded, without such gross error as to make
its decision untenable, that the facts support a particular decision?
IV. ANALYSIS OF STATON
A. Class Certification
The Ninth Circuit first reviewed the district court's
determination that class certification was appropriate. 39 Using the
general format outlined above, the Ninth Circuit correctly affirmed
the district court's decision. 40 It determined that the district court
fully evaluated the facts, applied the correct law, and thus did not
abuse its discretion.
41
The district court evaluated the facts before it to determine
whether the four prerequisites of class certification were met: "(1)
numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy of
representation. ' 4 2  It reviewed documentation from an array of
employee interviews, 43 listened to the narratives of proponents and
objectors regarding institutional discrimination," evaluated the
similarity of claims and defenses of the potential sub-groups, 45 and
reviewed the work performed to date by class counsel.46
38. Obviously the record provided by the district court is key to this
analysis. Thus, it is incumbent upon district courts to issue opinions that fully
describe what was reviewed and how the facts entwined with the law during
proceedings.
39. Staton, 327 F.3d at 953.
40. Id. at 953.
41. Id. at 953, 956.
42. Id. at 953; FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a).
43. Staton, 327 F.3d at 954.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 957.
46. Id. at 957-58.
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Of the above four Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
requirements, the Ninth Circuit devoted the most attention to a
review of the district court's decision as to commonality.47 Because
the class contained an array of workers that performed in different
positions and were from many locations, the majority questioned
whether a class action could actually be maintained during
litigation.48 The majority recognized that the district court applied
the correct Rule 23 law.49 It then found that the district court acted
within its discretion because the district court carefully reviewed the
facts applicable to commonality-including early evidence that
showed company-wide race discrimination 50 and the district court
did not interpret the facts before it in a clearly erroneous manner.
5 1
Moreover, the objectors did not raise the need for subclasses, which
boosted the district court's decision. 52 The Ninth Circuit stressed
that the district court could have decided that the proposed class was
too diverse (and thus denied class certification) and still have been
within its discretion because the district court thoroughly examined
the evidence before it. 53 The majority's decision and review as to
class certification is a useful example of the proper application of the
abuse of discretion standard.
B. The Consent Decree
The Ninth Circuit next reviewed the district court's evaluation
and approval of the proposed consent decree.54 It indicated that it
was "somewhat uneasy, reading the settlement as a whole" 55 and
then concluded that the district court abused its discretion in
approving the consent decree. The Ninth Circuit's reasons were
twofold. First, "the district court erred in approving the proposed
attorneys' fees award.",56  Second, the "district court abused its
47. Id. at 953-59.
48. Id. at 953-54.
49. Id. at 956.
50. Id. at 954.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 956.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 959.
55. Id. at 961.
56. Id. at 974; see supra note 13. As mentioned previously, this ground of
reversal is not addressed by this Comment because it merits separate
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discretion in finding the settlement agreement to be fair, adequate
and reasonable." 57 Thus, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for
determination of these issues.58  As discussed below, the Ninth
Circuit improperly reversed the district court's approval of the
distribution of funds to class members by applying in effect a quasi
de novo standard of review rather than an abuse of discretion
standard.
1. The appropriate legal standard
The Ninth Circuit correctly stated that a proposed settlement, as
a whole, must be "'fundamentally fair, adequate and reasonable."'
59
The Ninth Circuit typically reviews the Hanlon factors to determine
if a settlement complies with these requirements. 60  These factors
include:
[T]he strength of the plaintiffs' case; the risk, expense,
complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the risk
of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; the
amount offered in settlement; the extent of discovery
completed and the stage of the proceedings; the experience
and views of counsel;... and the reaction of the class
members to the proposed settlement.
6 1
consideration. However, it is worth mentioning that the Ninth Circuit may
have erred in reversing the fee provision. On the one hand, the procedure used
by the district court does not comport with the typical procedures used in class
action cases, and thus the Ninth Circuit may have been correct in reversing.
On the other hand, the typical procedures are not required procedures. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 52 provides the basic framework for fee allocation.
Rule 23 was recently amended to reflect the typical procedures and
incorporates Rule 52. However, both rules leave open the possibility that other
methods may be acceptable if the substance of the fee allocation is within
acceptable limits. When this is the case, reversing due to form over substance
seems to defeat the general goal of reaching a mutually agreeable settlement.
57. Staton, 327 F.3d at 978.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 959 (quoting Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026
(9th Cir. 1998)).
60. See, e.g., In re Mego Fin. Corp. See. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 458 (9th Cir.
2000); see also Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 953 (9th Cir. 2003).
61. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026.
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The Ninth Circuit has stated that "[t]he district court must show that
it has explored these factors comprehensively to survive appellate
review. ' 6
2. The release and injunctive provisions
The consent decree approved by the district court in Staton
included a broad release provision 63 as well as many forms of
injunctive relief.64 The Ninth Circuit objected to these portions of
the decree but correctly affirmed the district court's holding as there
was no clear abuse of discretion. As the Ninth Circuit noted, the
district court correctly concluded that the injunctive provisions did
not favor recovery by one member over another, and although the
release provisions were broad, members had a clear opportunity to
opt out. 65  This case is not like Molski, where broad release
provisions left many class members without any recovery and
violated their due process rights. 66 However, because the Staton
provisions were suspect, the Ninth Circuit was "somewhat uneasy,
reading the settlement as a whole,"67 and turned to an in-depth
review of the allocation of funds to class members and the attorneys'
fees provision.
68
3. The value and distribution of funds to class members
As stated previously, the proposed consent decree provided for a
monetary award of $7.3 million, as well as injunctive relief valued
62. In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d at 458.
63. Staton, 327 F.3d at 947.
64. Id. at 949; see supra text accompanying note 26.
65. Staton, 327 F.3d at 947, 962-63; see supra note 22 and accompanying
text.
66. Molski, 318 F.3d at 942. In Molski, the Ninth Circuit reversed and
remanded the district court's decision to approve a consent decree that
provided almost exclusively for injunctive relief to the mobility-impaired class.
Id. at 941-44. The Ninth Circuit reviewed the decision for abuse of discretion
and found that the consent decree contained broad release provisions that left
too many class members without recovery and that class members' due process
rights were violated. Id. at 942, 955-56. These flaws made the terms of the
decree "inadequate and fundamentally unfair," which led the Ninth Circuit to
conclude that the district court judge had abused her discretion. Id at 942.
67. Staton, 327 F.3d at 961.
68. Id. at 963.
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by class counsel at approximately $3.65 million.69 Class members
were given an opportunity to opt out of the monetary relief, but were
not given a similar opportunity to opt out of the injunctive relief.
70
The injunctive relief applied across the board to all class members
affected by each provision.
7 1
Of the $7.3 million, $3.77 million was divided between the 264
named plaintiffs and class members that actively participated in the
litigation.72 The active participants received awards ranging from
$5000 to $50,000, with an average award of $16,500. 73  The
remaining $3.53 million was to be distributed among the remainder
of the 15,000-member class. 74 At the cut-off date, 3400 of the nearly
15,000 class members had applied for an award, which would
therefore average around $1000 each.75
The district court correctly looked to the Hanlon factors in
determining that the award was appropriate. For example, in one
passage the district court assessed three of the Hanlon factors: "(1)
the strength of the plaintiffs' case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity,
and likely duration of further litigation; and (3) the risk of
maintaining class action status throughout the trial. 76 The district
court stated:
The strengths of the plaintiffs' claims and the risks of future
litigation are clearly related questions. Boeing has faced a
series of individual race discrimination law suits in recent
years and has won every one. Although the number of
named plaintiffs in this case and the descriptions of their
experiences lend credence to their allegations,
discrimination cases are notoriously difficult to prove...
There is also some risk that the class certified by the Court
69. Id. at 948-49. The $3.65 million figure covers implementation, notice,
and injunctive relief. Id. at 949.
70. Id. at 947-48. This is consistent with class relief under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b).
71. Staton, 327 F.3d at 949-51; see supra note 27.
72. Staton, 327 F.3d at 948. Plaintiffs' counsel identified these 264
members as either having the strongest claims, or as those willing to take the
risk and expend the time and money necessary to pursue the litigation. Id. at
975-76.
73. Id. at 948.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 980 (Trott, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying note 61.
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would not survive a challenge by Boeing .. [because] the
class claims are too individual to meet the commonality and
typicality requirements. Finally, there is no doubt that
continued litigation would be enormously burdensome and
expensive for the plaintiffs as well as for Boeing.
77
Similar passages are quoted throughout both the majority and
dissenting opinions. 78  In addition, the district court carefully
evaluated the award differential between class members to determine
if the fact that active participants received larger awards than the
remainder of the class was evidence of collusion.79
The Ninth Circuit properly asked whether the district court
could have interpreted the facts as it did, and whether the facts as
announced by the district court could support the district court's
decision. However, the Ninth Circuit then erred by examining the
facts too closely and making independent determinations as to what
the facts meant, rather than using the facts in the record to review the
propriety of the district court's decision. The problem with this sort
of quasi de novo review of the facts is the lack of evidence and
witnesses in front of the appellate court. When the trial court sets
forth a record supporting its conclusions, which are in turn drawn
from the interaction of the facts of the case and the law, its decision
should be given due deference.
80
An appropriate factual analysis by a Ninth Circuit appellate
panel is illustrated in Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc.,81 where the
district court failed to give any reason or evidence to support its
decision to uphold a class certification order.8 2 In Valentino, the
Ninth Circuit vacated a products liability class certification order
because the district court failed to show that the class met the
77. Staton, 327 F.3d at 980 (Trott, J., dissenting) (quoting the district
court).
78. For example, the majority discussed the district court's findings in
regards to the objector's contentions. Id. at 951-52. The majority also agreed
with the district court that there was no evidence of outright collusion. Id. at
958. The dissent presented additional passages from the district court. Id. at
979-86 (Trott, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 975.
80. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
81. 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996).
82. Id. at 1234.
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requirements of Rule 23.83 Because the order was "brief and
conclusory," the Valentino court was unable to determine if the
lower court evaluated the facts or the law.84 Likewise, in Local Joint
Executive Board of Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas
Sands, Inc.,85 the deference typically due a trial court was
disregarded because the district court made no findings about the
application of the Rule 23 provisions to the facts of the case before
the court.
86
Thus, merely stating that a review was made will generally meet
neither the evidentiary nor record requirement necessary for the
appellate court to afford deference to the trial court.87 However,
where the trial court supports its statement of the law with sufficient
evidence to justify its decision, even if the appellate court thinks a
different decision was more appropriate, the appellate court should
not reverse unless there is clear error.
88
In contrast to the above cases, the district court in Staton set
forth adequate evidence that it evaluated both the facts and law
presented in the case.89 Thus, its decision deserved due deference
from the appellate court. The Ninth Circuit should have asked only
whether the facts as set forth by the district court were clearly
erroneous, and if they were not clearly erroneous, if the facts could
have supported the district court's decision. However, the Ninth
Circuit instead applied a quasi de novo standard of review.
An example of the Ninth Circuit's quasi de novo review is seen
in its treatment of the question of collusion. The district court
recognized the award differential and stated that "excessive
payments to named class members can be an indication that the
agreement was reached through fraud or collusion."90 However, it
found there was no collusion, especially considering the fact that
collusion would have required the participation of 264 class
83. Id. at 1230.
84. Id. at 1234. In fact, the only thing that was clear to the Valentino court
was the district judge's desire to encourage settlement. Id.
85. 244 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2001).
86. Id. at 1161.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See, e.g., supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
90. Staton, 327 F.3d at 975 (quoting the district court).
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members, which is quite a large group to get behind a scam.
91
Additionally, the district court explained that those receiving higher
awards were identified as having the strongest claims and would thus
be the most likely recipients of the largest awards.
92
The Ninth Circuit rejected these conclusions, but not because the
district court applied the wrong law or was clearly erroneous in its
findings of fact. Instead, the Ninth Circuit rejected these conclusions
because it felt "somewhat uneasy, reading the settlement as a
whole."93 Because of its discomfort, the Ninth Circuit drew its own
bare conclusions despite the clear availability of findings by the
district court.
For example, the Ninth Circuit rejected the district court's
conclusion that those receiving higher awards had the strongest
claims.94  The Ninth Circuit stated that direct evidence of a link
between the amount of the award and the strength of the claim was
necessary, especially due to the fact that those receiving higher
awards retained counsel prior to settlement.95  However, class
counsel agreed to pay back any amounts received under the original
retainer agreements. 96 Thus, there was no additional incentive to
ensure a higher award. Moreover, this case had not progressed
through litigation so the court did not know whether the members'
claims would prevail at trial.97 It is for this very reason that the trial
court was in the best position, with witnesses and evidence before
it,98 to make a decision as to the likelihood that the claims would
survive and as to what relative value the claims should be assigned.
91. Id. at 981 (Trott, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 975-76.
93. Id. at 961.
94. Id. at 975.
95. Id. at 976; see also id. at 946; supra note 15.
96. Staton, 327 F.3d at 977 n.26.
97. Id. at 962 n.14. This Comment would arrive at an entirely different
conclusion if the Ninth Circuit had determined that the facts actually showed
that the active participant claims were not as strong as other claims, and thus
the district court's conclusions were clearly erroneous. Similarly, had the
district court not supported its conclusions with any evidence, the Ninth Circuit
would have been justified in its conclusions.
98. Evidence included statements by plaintiffs' counsel regarding the
strength of claims as well as the general participation of those involved. Id. at
976.
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Furthermore, in deciding facts for itself, the majority determined
that an average differential of approximately sixteen times existed
between active and non-active class members, and concluded that the
record did not support such a difference.99 However, the Ninth
Circuit erred by looking merely at the average award differential,
which skews the numbers. Many of the awards were closer to
$5000, thus creating a differential of five times. Such a differential
has been acceptable in past cases,100 and it was accepted by the
district court.
The majority attempted to distinguish its previous acceptance of
incentive awards from the facts of Staton, relying primarily on the
fact that unnamed plaintiffs received large awards in Staton.
1°1
However, in so doing, the majority failed to recognize the additional
commitment of these other active participants, as well as the district
court's finding that most of the active class members had stronger
claims. The majority glossed over this problem by stating that "class
members can certainly be repaid for any cost allotment."'
10 2
However, the time and risk associated with participating in litigation
cannot be quantified solely by cost allotment. The majority erred by
ignoring the district court's findings that supported a larger award to
active participants.
On a final note, the majority also ignored the fact that an opt-out
provision was available, which reduced the risk of the differential
since class members could preserve individual claims. It is
important to note that only 500 out of 15,000 class members-three
percent-opted out.10 3 The district court implicitly recognized that
this was a small percentage of the class, which indicated a large
majority had not taken issue with the provisions and made it less
likely collusion existed.
99. Id. at 975.
100. The majority discussed its past approval of various large awards,
including two $5000 incentive awards in In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213
F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 2000). See Staton, 327 F.3d at 976. In Mego, the class
consisted of 5400 potential members and the settlement was valued at $1.725
million. Id. Each class member would have received approximately $320.
101. Staton, 327 F.3d at 977.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 948. Note that these numbers are approximations as discussed in
the Ninth Circuit opinion.
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It is clear, as the dissent pointed out, that the district court
considered the strength of individual claims and the risk to active
class members as well as the expense, complexity, and duration of
further litigation. 104 By analyzing the facts under the Hanlon factors
and setting forth a record that indicated evaluation of these factors,
the district court presented enough evidence to support its decision.
By reviewing the facts in a quasi de novo manner, rather than
scrutinizing whether the district court clearly erred in its factual
determinations, the Ninth Circuit failed to afford the district court
due deference and trampled the court's findings without justification.
V. CONCLUSION
The abuse of discretion standard of review has been expanded to
an unacceptable point. Appellate courts are not adequately equipped
to review factually based decisions anew because the appellate court
only receives a record of the district court's evaluation of the facts
and law, and it does not see the evidence or the witnesses before it.
De novo review is only appropriate where a matter can be decided on
the basis of law. This is why the Ninth Circuit has stated that to
overturn a district court's approval of a settlement agreement, the
judge must have applied the wrong legal standard or have acted in a
clearly erroneous manner 1°-actions that do not require a full and
complete review of the facts. By so expanding appellate review, the
Ninth Circuit has opened the door for a docket nightmare. Litigants
may now expect their facts to be reviewed with a quasi de novo
standard of review and will be more apt to appeal. Additionally, the
appeal process will take longer if the court has to reevaluate all of the
facts. For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit would do well to draw the
abuse of discretion standard back in, and to restore appellate review
to its appropriate level.
Lindsay Gayle Stevenson
104. Id. at 980 (Trott, J., dissenting).
105. In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 458 (9th Cir. 2000).
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